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WHAT PUBLIC DEFENDERS DON’T (HAVE TO) TELL 
THEIR CLIENTS 
 
Steven Zeidman1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
New York State courts, like many other state and federal courts, have 
seen an increase in cases that pit lawyer versus client; where the lawyer 
wanted to proceed in one way and the client wanted to go in another 
direction. The resulting decisions, often inconsistent and irreconcilable, 
reflect the difficulties in navigating the lawyer-client relationship. 
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals again waded directly into the 
muddy waters of attorney versus client decision-making.2 On the face of it, 
the Court was deciding whether counsel needed his client’s consent before 
telling the prosecutor that his client would not exercise his statutory right to 
testify in the Grand Jury.3 However, lurking beneath the surface are the 
larger and related questions of who, between lawyer and client, has ultimate 
decision-making power, and what information lawyers must provide clients 
about their rights. 
Marcus Hogan was arrested on Tuesday, May 24, 2005 for being in the 
wrong place at the wrong time. Mr. Hogan was in his former girlfriend’s 
apartment when police officers entered to execute a search warrant for the 
premises.4 Officers testified that as they came into the apartment they saw 
Hogan running from the kitchen where, in open view, they discovered 
                                                
1 Professor, CUNY School of Law; JD, Duke University School of Law. As always, I 
thank Mari Curbelo and Tom Klein for their encouragement and critiques.  I also gratefully 
acknowledge the exceptional research assistance of Jacob Chin and the support of CUNY 
School of Law. 
2 People v. Hogan, 26 N.Y.3d 779 (2016). 
3 Id. at 781; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §190.50(5) (McKinney 1978) (prescribing a 
defendant’s right to testify before the Grand Jury). 
4 Hogan, 26 N.Y.3d at 781-82. 
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cocaine, baggies and a razor blade.5 Hogan’s former girlfriend, Hope 
Fisher, was also inside the apartment and she, too, was arrested.  
Since Mr. Hogan did not live at the apartment or have any contraband 
on him when he was stopped by the police, the prosecution’s case hinged on 
the so-called drug factory presumption.6 New York law allows “a 
permissible presumption, under which the [fact-finder] may assume the 
requisite criminal possession simply because the defendant . . . is within a 
proximate degree of closeness to drugs found in plain view, under 
circumstances that evince the existence of a drug sale operation[.]”7 
Mr. Hogan appeared in court on May 26, 2005 and his case was 
scheduled for a preliminary hearing on Friday, May 27, 2005.8 However, on 
May 27, Mr. Hogan asked that his lawyer subpoena Ms. Fisher to testify on 
his behalf.9 Apparently, almost from the moment of arrest, Ms. Fisher took 
full and sole responsibility for the drugs and related paraphernalia.10 As a 
result, the preliminary hearing was adjourned until the following 
Wednesday, June 1, 2005. Nevertheless, at approximately 4:00 p.m. on 
Friday, May 27, the prosecution faxed notice to defense counsel of their 
intent to bypass the preliminary hearing and present the case to the Grand 
Jury on Tuesday, May 31 at 1:45 p.m.11 The fax further instructed defense 
counsel to notify the prosecutor if his client wanted to testify in the Grand 
Jury.  
Friday, May 27, 2005 was the beginning of Memorial Day weekend, 
                                                
5 Id. at 782. 
6 Id. at 783 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.25(2) (McKinney 1985)).  
7 People v. Kims, 24 N.Y.3d 422, 432 (2014) (citing People v. Daniels, 37 N.Y.2d 624, 
630-31 (1975)); see also William C. Donnino, The “Close Proximity” Presumption, in 
Practice Commentaries, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.25 (McKinney 1985) (“The presumption 
was intended to address the issue of proof of knowing possession by those who were 
supervising or participating in the preparation of drugs for resale but who did not have 
personal physical possession of the drugs when the police lawfully entered the premises.”), 
quoted in Hogan, 26 N.Y.3d at 784. 
8 Record on Appeal at 37, People v. Hogan, 26 N.Y.3d 779 (2016) (No. 18), APL-
2015-00035.  
9 Id.  
10 Id. at 439. On June 3, the prosecutor received a notarized letter from Ms. Fisher in 
which she assumed full responsibility for all the drugs and other items recovered from her 
apartment. Id.  Fisher testified that “Marcus Hogan is not at all in any way possible 
responsible for the charges brought upon him . . . . Everything that was found . . . was mine 
and I accept full responsibility[.]” Id. at 579. Ms. Fisher eventually entered a plea of guilty 
to a reduced charge with a promise of a sentence of probation but only after she on the 
record disavowed part of the statement she made in her letter. Id. at 322-87. 
11 Hogan, 26 N.Y.3d at 782; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.80 (McKinney 
1982) (providing that the defendant must be released from custody if the prosecution does 
not obtain an indictment or provide a preliminary hearing within 120 or 144 hours of 
arrest); Record on Appeal, supra note 7, at 527-28. 
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and Hogan’s defense counsel had left his office before the fax arrived.12 He 
did not see the fax until Tuesday morning, May 31, the very day the 
prosecution was presenting the case to the Grand Jury.13 Defense counsel 
immediately contacted the prosecutor and told her that his client was not 
going to testify.14 The prosecutor went ahead with the Grand Jury 
presentation and Hogan was indicted for Criminal Possession of a 
Controlled Substance in the Fifth Degree and related charges.15 Mr. Hogan 
first learned about the Grand Jury presentation and indictment the next day, 
June 1.16  
Hogan was arraigned on the indictment on June 21, 2005.17 On July 19, 
defense counsel filed an omnibus motion but did not address the adequacy 
and timeliness of the Grand Jury notice until he filed a supplemental motion 
on August 19, 2005 seeking to have the indictment dismissed and giving his 
client the opportunity to testify before the Grand Jury.18 Defense counsel 
argued that he received late and inadequate notice of the Grand Jury 
presentation, thereby preventing his client from asserting his statutory right 
to testify.19 The trial court focused on the requirement that motions to 
dismiss an indictment for failure to provide the accused the opportunity to 
testify must be brought within five days of arraignment and denied the 
motion as untimely.20  
The judge eventually granted Mr. Hogan’s request for a new court-
appointed lawyer.21 A non-jury trial commenced on May 1, 2006 and ended 
two days later.22 The judge found Mr. Hogan guilty of Criminal Possession 
of a Controlled Substance in the Fifth Degree and associated charges, and 
                                                
12 Hogan, 26 N.Y.3d at 782.  
13 Id. During oral argument in the Court of Appeals, Judge Eugene Pigott expressed 
concern with the prosecution sending a fax on a Friday afternoon prior to a holiday 
weekend, and seemed to question whether that provided sufficient statutorily required 
notice for the defendant to consider whether to exercise his right to testify in the Grand 
Jury.  After noting the importance of the Grand Jury, he asked whether the timing of the 
notice was a “cheap shot” or some kind of “gamesmanship.” Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 17-18, People v. Hogan, 26 N.Y.3d 779 (2016) (No. 18), APL-2015-00035.  
14 Hogan, 26 N.Y.3d at 782. Defense counsel recalled telling the prosecutor that he 
“didn’t see the benefit to it, only the harm.” Id.  
15 Id. 
16 Record on Appeal, supra note 7, at 528.  
17 Id. at 29.  
18 Id. at 525; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 190.50(5)(a), 210.35(4) (McKinney 
1978). 
19 Record on Appeal, supra note 7, at 528.  
20 Id. at 545; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 190.50(5)(a), 210.35(4) (McKinney 1978). Mr. 
Hogan was arraigned on the indictment on June 21 and counsel filed his motion on August 
19 – a delay of 59 days. Record on Appeal, supra note 7, at 19-50.  
21 Record on Appeal, supra note 7, at 60. 
22 Id. at 67-305. 
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sentenced him to nine years in state prison.23  
Throughout the entire proceedings, Mr. Hogan kept trying to refocus the 
issue. His argument was not just that the prosecutor’s Grand Jury notice was 
defective, but also that the decision to testify should have been his, not 
defense counsel’s, to make, or, if not, that defense counsel had an obligation 
to consult with him before telling the prosecutor that he would not testify.24 
Put another way, Mr. Hogan was quite correctly framing the issue as a 
question of the allocation and attendant responsibilities of decision-making 
authority between lawyers and clients.  
 
I.   THE LAWYER AS DECISION MAKER 
 
The Court of Appeals began its analysis in Hogan by adhering to the 
prevailing fundamental versus strategic decisions taxonomy. According to 
the U.S. Supreme Court case of Jones v. Barnes, only four of the myriad 
decisions made in the course of a criminal case are deemed sufficiently 
personal and fundamental for the accused to have ultimate decision-making 
authority: whether to plead guilty; whether to testify at trial; whether to 
have a jury or judge trial; and whether to appeal.25  
The Court hewed to the traditional view that only those so-called 
fundamental four decisions were reserved for the accused and all others 
were strategic and ceded to defense counsel. However, the Court did more 
than just hold that the decision whether to testify in the Grand Jury was 
strategic and for the lawyer to make. The Court declined to squarely address 
defense counsel’s failure to consult with Hogan before deciding he would 
not testify, suggesting that since the lawyer is the ultimate decision maker 
he was not required to consult with his client about the decision. In other 
words, it was of no constitutional moment that Hogan had no input into the 
decision regarding his right to testify in the Grand Jury. 
The Hogan Court also seemed to go out of its way to make clear that 
counsel had a constitutional duty to make strategic decisions even in the 
face of his client’s express disapproval: “If defense counsel solely defers to 
a defendant, without exercising his or her professional judgment, on a 
decision that is ‘for the attorney, not the accused, to make’ because it is not 
fundamental, the defendant is deprived of ‘the expert judgment of counsel 
to which the Sixth Amendment entitles him’ or her[.]”26 While many 
lawyers feel it is appropriate, if not constitutionally or ethically required, for 
them to defer to their client’s wishes even on strategic decisions, the Court 
                                                
23 Hogan, 26 N.Y.3d at 783.  
24 Id. at 785.  
25 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).  
26 Hogan, 26 N.Y.3d. at 786 (citing People v. Colville, 20 N.Y.3d 20, 32 (2012)).   
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made it clear that the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of 
counsel requires lawyers to overrule their clients when there is 
disagreement over tactics.  
Hogan seems to follow logically from People v. Colville,27 a case 
decided by the Court just a few years earlier. Delroy Colville was charged 
with murder for stabbing and killing the 20-year-old victim on the third 
floor of a single room occupancy dwelling during an argument.28 
At the conclusion of the evidence, defense counsel informed the court 
that he had advised the defendant that Manslaughter in the First and Second 
Degrees should be charged to the jury as lesser-included offenses29 because 
charging murder alone left the jury with “no leeway, no choice.”30 Counsel, 
accordingly, requested that Manslaughter in the First and Second Degrees 
be charged to the jury, but the court denied the request and stated it would 
allow counsel to address the issue again when the trial reconvened. 
Defense counsel subsequently informed the court that, after discussing 
the issue with the defendant again, he had been advised that the defendant 
did not want the lesser-included offenses charged to the jury. Counsel, 
however, still believed, and still advised his client, that submitting the lesser 
included charges was the best way to proceed. Faced with this quandary, 
counsel stated:  
[A]s the attorney here, I am only . . . as the Supreme Court has 
said, the guiding hand. It is my opinion as a matter of strategy, 
and as a matter of sound practice, it is my opinion that lesser-
included should be submitted. It gives—in my opinion, and 
based upon my experience only—it gives the jury an out. . . . I 
am trying to protect Mr. Colville here . . . . I don’t know where to 
go from here except I am always guided by the Court.31 
After some further dialogue with counsel, the court spoke directly to 
Mr. Colville and asked if he wanted to withdraw the request to charge 
Manslaughter in the First and Second Degree. The following exchange took 
place: 
[Colville]: If the jury feels that I intentionally caused the death of 
Mr. Gardner, there is nothing I can do about it. I am prepared. 
The first time in my life I’ve been in a situation like this, I’ve 
been incarcerated, so . . . whatever decision they make, there is 
nothing I can do about it. 
                                                
27 Colville, 20 N.Y.3d at 20. 
28 Id. at 21.  
29 Id. at 23; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 300.50 (McKinney 2003).   
30 People v. Colville, 79 A.D.3d 189, 194 (2d Dep’t 2010).  
31 Id. at 194-95. 
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THE COURT: You don’t want to give them the other charges? 
[Colville]: No.32 
After a brief recess, the court made clear for the record that the 
defendant no longer wanted lesser offenses included in the charge to the 
jury, and defense counsel reiterated that this was against his advice.33 The 
jury was instructed to only consider the Murder charge and Colville was 
convicted.34  
On appeal, the question was initially framed around whether the 
decision about lesser included charges was for the accused or his lawyer to 
make.35 However, New York’s intermediate appellate court made short 
shrift of the issue by observing that if it was a fundamental decision then the 
defendant had been allowed to be the ultimate decision maker, and if it was 
a strategic decision then it was reasonable for the lawyer to have acceded to 
his client’s request.36 
The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial.37 The Court 
determined that the decision whether to seek a jury instruction about lesser 
included offenses was a strategic one for the attorney to make, and that 
“[B]y deferring to defendant, the [trial] judge denied him the expert 
judgment of counsel to which the Sixth Amendment entitles him.”38  
Taken together, Hogan and Colville show the Court’s clear preference 
for vesting decision-making power in defense counsel. In Hogan, the 
defendant claimed that the decision to testify in the Grand Jury was his to 
make and that, at a minimum, he had to be consulted before his lawyer 
made any decision.39 The Court disagreed on both counts: the Grand Jury 
decision is ultimately for the lawyer to make and the lawyer is not required 
to consult with the client before making that decision.40  
In Colville, the accused was consulted repeatedly, so the client’s input 
was not the issue. Instead, the defendant claimed on appeal that the decision 
to submit lesser included offenses was for the lawyer,41 not the accused, to 
make. In other words, he argued that his lawyer should have overridden his 
request, exercised independent professional judgment, and saved him from 
                                                
32 Id. at 195-96. 
33 Id. at 196.  
34 Id. at 197. 
35 Id. at 197.  
36 Colville, 79 A.D.3d at 201.  
37 People v. Colville, 20 N.Y.3d 20, 23 (2012). 
38 Id. at 32. 
39 People v. Hogan, 26 N.Y.3d 779, 787 (2016).  
40 Id. The Court did note, however, that the “better practice may be for counsel to 
consult with his or her client[.]”  Id. It is noteworthy that the Court qualified the “better 
practice” by the use of the words “may be” rather than the word “is.” Id.  
41 Colville, 20 N.Y.3d at 23. 
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himself. The Court agreed.42  
The full impact of the holdings in Hogan and Colville is apparent in the 
very recent case of Romero v. Sheahan.43 Romero was convicted of 
Robbery in the First Degree and filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus claiming that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective 
assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment because: (1) counsel failed 
to request that the jury be instructed on the affirmative defense to the charge 
of First Degree Robbery that the object displayed in the commission of the 
robbery was not a loaded weapon capable of producing death or other 
serious physical injury44 and (2) counsel failed to request the lesser-
included charge of Second Degree Robbery or consult with Romero before 
making that decision.45 
The Court dealt swiftly and perfunctorily with the question of counsel’s 
decision not to request jury instructions regarding the affirmative defense to 
Robbery in the First Degree or to add the charge of Robbery in the Second 
Degree.46 In the Court’s view, the defense theory of misidentification made 
it reasonable for defense counsel to avoid asking for any instructions that 
might dilute the force of his argument that the defendant was not the person 
who committed the robbery.  
But as in Hogan, the defendant in Romero also argued that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to even consult with him prior to making these crucial 
                                                
42 Id. For a recent application of Colville, see People v. Lowery, 127 A.D.3d 1109 (2d 
Dep’t 2015). In Lowery, the defendant was charged with robbery. Defense counsel advised 
the trial judge that he wanted to request a jury charge on the lesser-included offense of petit 
larceny but that the defendant opposed that request. The judge deferred to the defendant 
and did not submit the lesser-included offense of petit larceny to the jury.  The appellate 
court, citing to Colville, reversed the defendant’s conviction holding that the decision 
whether to seek a jury charge on a lesser-included offense is a matter of strategy and tactics 
which is “for the attorney, not the accused, to make.” Id. at 1110 (quoting Colville, 20 
N.Y.3d at 32). 
43 Romero v. Sheahan, No. 13-CV-4048 (SJF), 2016 WL 3460372 (E.D.N.Y. June 21, 
2016). 
44 Id. at *4; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 160.15(4) (McKinney 1973) provides in pertinent part: 
“A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when he forcibly steals property and 
when, in the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he or 
another participant in the crime: . . . Displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, 
shotgun, machine gun or other firearm; except that in any prosecution under this 
subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that such pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine 
gun or other firearm was not a loaded weapon from which a shot, readily capable of 
producing death or other serious physical injury, could be discharged. Nothing contained in 
this subdivision shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude conviction of, 
robbery in the second degree, robbery in the third degree or any other crime.” 
45 Romero, 2016 WL 3460372, at *4.  
46 Id. at *8.  
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decisions.47 In language strikingly similar to Hogan, the District Court held 
that: 
Even if better practice would have been for trial counsel to 
discuss his decision not to request affirmative defense and 
“lesser included charge” instructions with Romero (assuming he 
did not), the New York Court of Appeals has held that the 
decision regarding whether or not to request a “lesser included 
charge” instruction is ultimately the attorney’s, not the 
defendant’s, to make. Thus, even if Romero had objected to trial 
counsel’s decision not to pursue contradictory misidentification 
and “lesser included charge” strategies, trial counsel would have 
been obligated to pursue the strategy that he, in his own 
professional judgment, believed had the highest likelihood of 
success, notwithstanding Romero’s disagreement.48 
In sum, while it has long been the case that strategic decisions are for 
the lawyer to make, it now seems clear that counsel is not required to even 
discuss those decisions with her clients. If, however she chooses to do so, 
and then discovers that her client disagrees with her decision, she must 
override the client and do what she thinks is best.49 Put another way, no 
longer is defense counsel insulated from a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel by simply saying, in essence, that she merely did what her client 
told her to do.50  
                                                
47 Id. at *10. 
48 Id. at *11 (emphasis added) (citing People v. Colville, 20 N.Y.3d 20 (2012)). See 
also People v. Williams, No. 5522/00, 2014 WL 5243476 (N.Y. Supp. Ct. Oct. 6, 2014) 
(finding no ineffective assistance where counsel neglected to consult with defendant about 
charging lesser included offenses); People v. Brown, 117 A.D.3d 1536 (4th Dep’t 2014). 
49 In People v. Lee, 120 A.D.3d 1137 (1st Dep’t 2014), the defendant appealed his 
conviction claiming that his right to confrontation had been violated. At trial, the defendant 
had asked that the jury hear a guilty plea allocution from a co-defendant. Defense counsel 
objected but the trial judge read the transcript which included statements incriminating Lee. 
The Court held that “[t]he decision to introduce evidence was not a fundamental decision 
reserved to defendant, but a strategic or tactical decision for his attorney[.] Thus, defendant 
was deprived of his right to counsel when the court admitted the evidence solely based on 
his own request, over his attorney’s vigorous and consistent opposition[.]” Id. at 1137-38 
(internal citations omitted). 
50 The Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), attempted to 
address the component parts of the Sixth Amendment’s requirement of effective assistance 
of counsel.  The Court set out a two-part test: to support a claim of ineffective assistance, 
the defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and that counsel’s actions had a prejudicial impact on the result.  Id. at 689-
92. The decisions in Hogan, Colville, and Romero indicate that it is not objectively 
reasonable for a lawyer to defer to a client on a strategic decision about which they 
disagree.  Of course, the actual decision made by defense counsel could still be subject to 
an evaluation of its objective reasonableness, but as the Court made clear in Strickland, 
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II. THE CLIENT AS DECISION MAKER 
 
Even as the Court is telling defense counsel to control the case and 
make the tactical decisions she deems best (even if in the face of the client’s 
express disagreement), there is lurking along a parallel track another line of 
cases that suggest the opposite; that the lawyer can, or maybe even should, 
defer to the client’s wishes even if she disagrees with the course of action 
the client desires or finds the defendant’s choice to be devoid of any logic 
or merit.  
In People v. Henriquez, the defendant, Michael Henriquez, approached 
a police officer and told him he had just killed his girlfriend. 51 Police 
officers went to Henriquez’s apartment and found the victim dead from 
numerous gunshot wounds to the head.52 Henriquez was taken to the 
precinct where he provided written and videotaped confessions.53 He was 
subsequently charged with Murder in the Second Degree.54 
After jury selection, Henriquez’s appointed lawyer informed the trial 
judge of a conflict he had with his client: 
Your Honor, there is something I want to put on the record. The 
defendant advised me this morning . . . he is directing me not to 
cross-examine any witnesses, not to object to any line of 
questioning, not to call – to go even further, not to approach the 
bench, not to participate in any bench conferences or side bars, 
not to have any defense in this case, not to call any witnesses, not 
to sum up, not to do anything. He has indicated to me he just 
wants me to sit here and do nothing.55 
Defense counsel then asked to be relieved from representing Mr. 
Henriquez and requested that Henriquez represent himself.56 Henriquez, 
however, stated, “I didn’t ask to represent myself. You can’t tell me I have 
to represent myself.”57 The trial judge affirmed Mr. Henriquez’s statement 
and informed him that he did not have to self-represent and denied defense 
                                                                                                                       
“strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts . . . are virtually 
unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are 
reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the 
limitations on investigation.” Id. at 690-91.    
51 People v. Henriquez, 3 N.Y.3d 210, 211 (2004). 
52 Id. at 212. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Respondent’s Brief at 7, People v. Henriquez, 3 N.Y.3d 210 (2004) (No. 121). 
56 Henriquez, 3 N.Y.3d at 212. 
57 Id. 
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counsel’s application to withdraw from the case.58  
The trial was filled with examples of defense counsel and the court 
deferring to the defendant on countless decisions and imbuing him with the 
power to control every aspect of the defense, including a multitude of 
strategic or tactical decisions.59 During jury selection, when an issue arose 
concerning substitution of a juror, defense counsel informed the judge that 
the defendant would not permit him to provide any input to the court.60 Just 
prior to the first witness being called to testify, the trial judge informed the 
defendant that he could always change his mind and “permit” his attorney 
to participate in the trial.61 During the trial, defense counsel objected to the 
testimony of a proposed prosecution witness because that person had been 
seated in the court during the testimony of earlier witnesses.62 Rather than 
rule on the objection, the court raised concerns that the objection was made 
without the defendant’s permission.63 Counsel thereupon conferred with the 
defendant and withdrew the objection.64 To make it abundantly clear who 
he thought controlled the defense case, the court at one point flat out told 
the defendant, “Mr. Henriquez, I am respecting your right to restrict your 
attorney in the way he defends you.”65  
The Court of Appeals upheld Henriquez’s conviction, finding that he 
was not denied his right to a fair trial and that he waived his right to the 
effective assistance of counsel by refusing self-representation and then 
restricting his lawyer’s participation.66 Rather than engage in a critical 
discussion of the allocation of decision-making authority between lawyers 
and clients, Jones v. Barnes, the relevant ethical rules, and the objective 
reasonableness of counsel’s behavior, the majority appears to have simply 
viewed the case as a malingering, obstreperous defendant who got his just 
desserts: “Defendant asserts that his constitutional right to a fair trial was 
                                                
58 Id. at 213.  
59 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 54, at 7 (explaining that defendant instructed counsel 
not to make an opening statement, not to cross-examine any witnesses, not to call any 
witnesses, not to make a closing statement, and not to object to any line of questioning).   
60 Id. at 15-16; see People v. Colon, 90 N.Y.2d 824, 826 (1997) (stating that matters 
concerning jury selection have long been considered strategic and for defense counsel to 
decide). “The selection of particular jurors falls within the category of tactical decisions 
entrusted to counsel, and defendants do not retain a personal veto power over counsel’s 
exercise of professional judgments[.]” Id.; see also United States v. Boyd, 86 F.3d 719, 724 
(7th Cir. 1996). 
61 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 54, at 14; Henriquez, 3 N.Y.3d at 213.   
62 FED. R. EVID. 615 (sequestering witnesses so that they do not hear testimony of 
other witnesses). 
63 Henriquez, 3 N.Y.3d at 213.  
64 Id.  
65 Id. at 222. 
66 Id. at 211, 217.  
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violated because the trial court and defense counsel respected his desire to 
refrain from presenting a defense.”67 While the Court writes of “respect” for 
the defendant, the opinion is devoid of any discussion of the thorny moral 
and ethical issues involved in the client autonomy versus lawyer 
paternalism aspect of the “who decides” debate. Rather, the decision reads 
more like the court’s way of saying, “you made your bed and now you have 
to lie in it.”  
On the other hand, the lengthy dissent of Judge George Bundy Smith 
places the case entirely in the allocation-of-decision-making context: “The 
trial court and defense counsel did not adhere to the legal and professional 
standards regarding the allocation of decision-making authority between the 
accused and defense counsel.”68  
The dissent’s tone of incredulity and repulsion is very apparent:  
As a consequence of the trial court’s and defense counsel’s 
compliance with defendant’s instructions . . . [d]efense counsel 
did not respond to the People’s opening statement, did not make 
any objections, cross-examine the People’s witnesses, make any 
oral motions at the close of the People’s case, put on a case, 
make a closing statement or provide any input regarding 
proposed jury charges because defendant did not want him to. 
The trial court allowed defendant’s instructions to control and 
allowed defense counsel not to do anything on defendant’s 
behalf.69 
The dissent’s logic is straightforward. The defendant made it clear that 
he did not wish to represent himself and that he wanted a lawyer. “As such, 
defendant had the constitutional right to the effective assistance of 
counsel,”70 and sitting idly by as your client goes down a path of self-
destruction cannot possibly be labeled as “effective” assistance. Judge 
Bundy Smith refers to counsel’s “affirmative obligation”71 to provide 
effective assistance. In other words, once Henriquez said he wanted a 
                                                
67 Id. at 214 (emphasis added). 
68 Id. at 217-18 (G.B. Smith, J., dissenting). 
69 Id. at 222. The lawyer’s failure to do anything calls to mind the remarks of defense 
attorney Brendan Sullivan when he was representing Oliver North in the Iran-Contra 
scandal in 1987.  During the hearing in front of the Joint House-Senate Iran-Contra 
Committee, the Chair, Senator Daniel Inouye, admonished Sullivan for objecting to some 
of the questions put to his client and urged North to speak for himself.  Sullivan famously 
responded, “Well, sir, I’m not a potted plant. I’m here as the lawyer. That’s my job.”  
Special to the New York Times, Iran-Contra Hearings; Note of Braggadocio Resounds at 
Hearing, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/10/world/iran-
contra-hearings-note-of-braggadocio-resounds-at-hearing.html. 
70 Henriquez, 3 N.Y.3d at 225 (G.B. Smith, J., dissenting). 
71 Id.  
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lawyer, that lawyer had a constitutional duty to act, to make the strategic 
decisions he thought were best even if his client consistently and openly 
disagreed with those decisions.  
The import of Judge Bundy Smith’s reasoning should give pause to 
those lawyers who believe that the Henriquez trial was a travesty but 
consider themselves “client-centered” counselors who strive to vest their 
clients with autonomy and decision-making authority.72 Judge Bundy Smith 
writes that the trial judge “mistakenly increased defendant’s rights at 
trial[.]”73 For support, he quotes Supreme Court Justice Harlan: “I believe a 
lawyer may properly make a tactical determination of how to run a trial 
even in the face of his client’s incomprehension or even explicit 
disapproval.”74 Bundy Smith writes further that the majority’s decision 
“grants defendant too much power over the trial,” and suggests that if we go 
down this road it could “whittle away at the integrity of the trial process.”75 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Michael Henriquez subsequently moved pro se 
for a writ of habeas corpus alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of 
counsel.76 Magistrate Judge Kevin Fox, a former Public Defender, 
recommended that the writ be granted.77 According to Judge Fox,  
Henriquez made clear to the trial court that he did not wish to 
represent himself, but wanted to be represented by his trial 
                                                
72 See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 720 (1987) 
(“Broadly we can say that client-centered practice takes the principle of client decision-
making seriously, and derives from this premise the prescription that a central 
responsibility of the lawyer is to enable the client to exercise his right to choose.”); Ann 
Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 
1742-48 (1993); Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and 
Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990).  
73 Henriquez, 3 N.Y.3d at 228 (G.B. Smith, J., dissenting). 
74 Id. at 226 (quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 8 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring)); 
see also United States v. Chapman, 593 F.3d 365, 369 (4th Cir. 2010) (“The 
reasonableness of the tactical decision actually made by counsel is of course subject to 
challenge, but the decision is not unreasonable simply because the client expressed a 
contrary view.”).  The First Circuit put it even more affirmatively, noting that “counsel’s 
decision not to abide by the wishes of his client has no necessary bearing on the question of 
professional competence; indeed, in some instances, listening to the client rather than to the 
dictates of professional judgment may itself constitute incompetence.”  United States v. 
McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 1993); see also People v. Holt, 21 N.E.3d 695 (Ill. 2014) 
(finding Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a defendant a lawyer who will support the 
defendant’s position that he or she is competent to stand trial when counsel disagrees with 
that position).  
75 Henriquez, 3 N.Y.3d at 232 (G.B. Smith, J., dissenting). 
76 Henriquez v. McGinnis, No. 05 Civ. 10893 (DLC) (KNF), 2007 BL 217379 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2007) 
77 Id. at *16; see also Henriquez v. McGinnis, No. 05 Civ. 10893(DLC), 2007 WL 
844672, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2007). 
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counsel. . . . Once this fact was made known to the court and to . 
. . counsel, it should have been clear to them that acquiescing in 
Henriquez’s demands that prevented his attorney from acting as 
an advocate at the trial proceedings, and exercising his 
independent professional judgment in the management of the 
defense was an error of constitutional magnitude.78 
But revealing the ambiguous and unsettled nature of these issues, 
District Court Judge Denise Cote, a former prosecutor, rejected Magistrate 
Judge Fox’s recommendation as to ineffective assistance.79 Judge Cote’s 
opinion is couched in terms of the defendant’s right to do as he pleases: 
“Given that a defendant may waive altogether the right to assistance at trial 
from an attorney, and can of course choose to plead guilty and forego the 
right to a trial altogether, it takes no great leap to conclude that a defendant 
also has the ultimate right to instruct his attorney to present no defense on 
his behalf.”80 As with the majority decision in the Court of Appeals, the 
opinion speaks of the defendant’s rights, but is hardly about respect for 
autonomy. Rather, it reeks of disdain for the defendant daring to complain 
after he got what he wanted.81   
Although its facts are indeed unique, the Henriquez rationale has not 
proven to be sui generis. The suggestion continues to surface that allowing 
the accused to be the ultimate decision maker regarding tactics is somehow 
about respect for that defendant. The decision at issue in People v. Cruz was 
whether to pose a defense of complete innocence to Murder or to pursue 
defenses that might have led to a Manslaughter conviction.82 Defense 
counsel deferred to the client’s all-or-nothing defense and the appellate 
                                                
78 Henriquez, 2007 BL 217379, at *14. 
79 Henriquez, 2007 WL 844672, at *7. 
80 Id. (emphasis added) (“[N]ot every failure to subject the prosecution’s case to 
adversarial testing is a violation of the Sixth Amendment.”).    
81 Other jurisdictions have similarly held that a defendant cannot complain of 
ineffective assistance if counsel follows the client’s even foolhardy request.  In United 
States v. Wellington, 417 F.3d 284 (2d Cir. 2005), the defendant told his lawyer to stipulate 
to key facts and not to raise certain objections. Defense counsel told the court that “he did 
not necessarily agree with his client, but that defendant ‘has given a lot of thought to this 
and I advised him, [and] he’s the boss.’” Id. at 288. The Second Circuit observed that the 
strategy was “ill-advised and wholly ineffective,” but there was no ineffective assistance 
since defense counsel followed the defendant’s instructions. Id. See also In re Terrorist 
Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2008); Del Toro v. 
Quarterman, 498 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 2007) (“If, however, a client instructs his attorney 
not to hire an investigator or contact and interview witnesses, the client cannot later claim 
that the failure to do these things amounted to ineffective assistance.”).  
82 People v. Cruz, 88 A.D.3d 540 (1st Dep’t 2011). For example, defense could have 
pursued the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, or lack of homicidal 
intent. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney 2006).  
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court, in language similar to Henriquez, held that counsel “appropriately 
respected his client’s desire.”83 
More recently, in People v. Perry the decision in question involved the 
accused’s right to a 12-person jury.84 During jury deliberations, Hurricane 
Sandy hit New York City and caused court to close. Several days later, the 
court contacted the jurors about continuing to serve and excused one juror 
who said he had to leave the country.  
When trial resumed two days later, defense counsel objected to the 
discharge of the juror without her first having been consulted,85 and 
informed the court that she told defendant “‘a number of times that I do not 
think we should go forward with 11,’ but defendant was ‘extremely 
insistent,’ was ‘tired of this process,’ and did ‘not want to retry the case.’”86 
The trial judge confirmed that that was what the defendant wished to do, 
had the defendant and counsel sign waivers of the right to a 12-person jury, 
and proceeded with eleven jurors.  
The Appellate Division observed that the court should have given 
defense counsel an opportunity to be heard before excusing the juror, but 
held that the defendant waived his right to a 12-person jury.87 While the 
court cited Henriquez for the proposition that the defendant “must accept 
the decision he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made,”88 it 
inexplicably made no reference to Colville and the line of cases holding that 
defense counsel must override the client on strategic decisions on which 
they disagree. For that matter, it is astonishing that the Court of Appeals, in 
its decision in Colville giving awesome decision-making power to the 
lawyer, did not even mention Henriquez and its paean to respect for the 
defendant’s right to chart his own defense.  
The most current incarnation of the decision-making authority 
conundrum is People v. Clark.89 The defendant’s assigned counsel advised 
the court that he had discussed with the defendant the possibility of 
presenting defenses of extreme emotional disturbance and/or justification in 
addition to the misidentification defense favored by the defendant, but 
added:  
                                                
83 Cruz, 88 A.D.3d at 541 (emphasis added). 
84 People v. Perry, 129 A.D.3d 576 (1st Dep’t 2015), leave to appeal denied, 26 
N.Y.3d 970 (2015). See also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.05 (McKinney 1970).  
85 Perry, 129 A.D.3d at 577; CRIM. PROC. § 270.35(2)(b). 
86 Perry, 129 A.D.3d at 577. 
87 Id. Cf. Commonwealth v. Simmons, 394 S.W.3d 903, 904 (Ky. 2013) (holding that 
the right to be tried by a 12-person jury guaranteed by the state constitution is a 
fundamental entitlement that could not be waived unilaterally by defense counsel).  
88 Perry, 129 A.D.3d at 577 (quoting People v. Gajadhar, 9 N.Y.3d 438, 448 (2007)). 
89 People v. Clark, 129 A.D.3d 1 (2d Dep’t 2015), leave to appeal granted, 25 N.Y.3d 
1174 (2015). 
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I would need the defendant’s permission to make such an 
argument. . . . [H]e said no way. I do not wish to have you 
indicate in any manner, shape or form as far as justification or 
diminished capacity on the murder two. Without his permission 
I’ve told him I cannot do it.90  
Even while it cited to Colville and recognized that matters of strategy, 
like whether to request lesser included offenses for the jury’s consideration, 
are generally ceded to counsel, the Court stated that “a defendant 
unquestionably has the right to chart his own defense.”91 The Court further 
held that the decision to pursue a defense based solely on misidentification, 
and to affirmatively reject an alternate defense based on justification, 
involved a matter that was “personal” and “fundamental” to the defendant 
and “did not implicate a matter of trial strategy or tactics.”92 The Court 
reasoned that to require defense counsel in this case, over his client’s 
objection, to undermine the defendant’s assertion of innocence by the 
injection into the case of a factually and logically inconsistent defense 
would, under the circumstances presented, impermissibly compromise the 
defendant’s personal rights. Therefore, there existed “a sound basis for 
leaving the choice of defense, whether affirmative or ordinary, with the 
defendant rather than his or her attorney.”93  
Although the Court stated that “it was not the role of his counsel to 
override [the defendant’s] wishes,” it still had to address the Court of 
                                                
90 Clark, 129 A.D.3d at 6. 
91 Id. at 11 (quoting People v. DeGina, 72 N.Y.2d 768, 776 (1988)). The dissent 
directly confronted the notion that the accused has a right to “chart his own defense.” Id. at 
47. “The proposition that defense counsel in this case properly refused to exercise his own 
professional judgment since the defendant had the right to chart his own defense, and that 
counsel could not override the defendant’s wishes by advancing an inconsistent defense 
based on counsel’s view of the evidence, is a novel interpretation of the scope of a defense 
counsel’s duty.” Id. at 47 (Miller, J., dissenting). 
92 Id. at 11 (majority opinion) (quoting People v. Colville, 20 N.Y.3d 20, 31 (2012); 
People v. Petrovich, 87 N.Y.2d 961, 963 (1996)).  
93 Id. at 14. The Court likened the situation at hand to that in People v. Petrovich, 87 
N.Y.2d 961 (1996). In Petrovich, the trial court inquired whether the defendant wanted an 
instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, which, if 
successful, would reduce the murder counts to manslaughter. Id. at 962. Defense counsel 
responded affirmatively but the defendant disagreed. Id. Defense counsel insisted that he, 
not the defendant, should decide what instructions to request, but the trial court declined to 
charge the extreme emotional disturbance defense. Id. at 963. The defendant was convicted 
of murder and appealed, arguing that the trial court should have acted in accordance with 
his counsel’s wishes. Id. at 962. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that 
“the decision whether to request submission of the affirmative defense of extreme 
emotional disturbance to the jury falls to defendant” as it was more in the nature of a 
fundamental decision than one that implicated trial strategy or tactics. Id. at 963. 
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Appeals’s ruling in Colville to the contrary.94 First, the Court questioned 
whether granting counsel ultimate authority regarding which lesser-included 
offenses to request necessarily also gave counsel final say over which 
defenses to present.95 In other words, it appears the Court was clinging to 
the idea that the decision at issue in Clark was distinguishable from that in 
Colville and was more appropriately deemed to be a fundamental decision 
for the accused to make.96 Additionally, the Court noted that Clark’s trial 
took place two years before Colville was decided and counsel could not be 
deemed ineffective for failing to anticipate changes in the law.97  
If anything is clear it is that the current state of the law is ambiguous. 
Lawyers representing clients in criminal cases are left with no 
comprehensible guidance about when they must defer to or override their 
clients’ requests.98  
 
III. CHARTING A PATH FORWARD 
 
Michael Henriquez and Prince Clark certainly in hindsight needed to be 
saved from themselves. Their lawyers did as they were told and both 
defendants were convicted of Murder. To many, the lawyers’ abdication of 
decision-making responsibility was at best, wrongheaded, and at worst, 
cowardly and deplorable. And yet the dissent in both cases, arguing 
forcefully that defense counsel was ineffective for acceding to the client’s 
wishes, is also controversial.  
Many lawyers for indigent defendants ascribe to a version of client-
centered lawyering that seeks to imbue clients with agency, authority and 
autonomy.99 Those advocates fear that if lawyers exercise the tightfisted 
control over the case advocated in the Henriquez and Clark dissents, they 
are in effect subjugating their clients, overwhelmingly people of color, in 
much the same way as have a variety of governmental agencies. More 
specifically, Judge Bundy Smith’s admonition that the trial judge 
“mistakenly increased defendant’s rights” and “grant[ed] defendant too 
much power,” conjures up concerns of paternalism and of lawyers running 
roughshod over their clients.100 Contrast that language and the message it 
                                                
94 Clark, 129 A.D.3d at 14. 
95 Id. 
96 See id. 
97 Id. (citing People v. Lewis, 102 A.D.3d 505, 506 (1st Dep’t 2013); People v. Abner, 
101 A.D.3d 1628, 1629 (4th Dep’t 2012)). 
98 New York’s highest court granted leave in Clark and will hopefully take the 
opportunity to fashion a clear rule and clarify the critical question of who ultimately 
decides what in a criminal case. People v. Clark, 25 N.Y.3d 1174 (2015).  
99 See Dinerstein, supra note 71; see also Ellmann, supra note 71.  
100 People v. Henriquez, 3 N.Y.3d 201, 228, 232 (G.B. Smith, J., dissenting). 
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conveys with the equally blunt call for client autonomy from the dissent in 
Colville: “Because a defendant has the most to lose in a criminal proceeding 
(i.e., freedom), reason dictates that the defendant shall control his/her own 
destiny and have the ultimate authority regarding choices he/she makes 
(even if against the advice of counsel).”101 On a very fundamental level, the 
defendant bears the consequences of a conviction; the defendant, not the 
lawyer, serves the jail or prison time imposed after conviction and faces a 
host of collateral consequences.102  
Calls for defense counsel to be the ultimate decision maker also seem at 
odds with the longstanding judicial expectation that the defendant at the 
time of sentencing (and when eligible for parole) will accept full 
responsibility for his or her actions.103 Shouldn’t it then follow that the 
accused has responsibility for his or her trial?  
The “who decides” analysis must also factor into the equation what kind 
of defense counsel we are imagining. When a client disagrees with his 
privately retained counsel, he is free to hire another attorney to do his 
bidding.104 The majority of criminal defendants, however, are unable to 
afford counsel.105 In cases where counsel is appointed by the government, 
the client is not entitled to replace one lawyer with another,106 so the 
                                                
101 People v. Colville, 20 N.Y.3d 20, 35 (Jones, J., dissenting). 
102 See generally Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive 
State, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 301 (2015); INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) 
[hereinafter INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT]. 
103 See Mark W. Bennett & Ira P. Robbins, Last Words: A Survey and Analysis of 
Federal Judges’ Views on Allocution in Sentencing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 735, 739 (2013). 
Federal judges responding to a survey included “genuine remorse” and “acknowledgment 
of and sincere apology to the victims” among the characteristics of defendants’ allocutions 
that most impressed them, id. at 752, and advised defense attorneys to encourage their 
clients to “accept responsibility” for their actions, id. at 753. See also Kimberly A. Thomas, 
Beyond Mitigation: Towards a Theory of Allocution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2641 (2007). 
104 This freedom of choice is not absolute. A judge may refuse to permit the defendant 
to replace counsel if the judge views the switch as a dilatory tactic. See, e.g., United States 
v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 108 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1211 (1988) (“Such 
right must not obstruct orderly judicial procedure[.]”); see also United States v. Panzardi 
Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 815 (1st Cir. 1987). 
105 See, e.g., STEVEN K. SMITH & CAROL J. DEFRANCES., BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INDIGENT DEFENSE 1 (1996), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/id.pdf [https://perma.cc/QBW3-EVPA] (“In 1992, 
about 80% of defendants charged with felonies in the Nation’s 75 largest counties relied on  
a public defender or on assigned counsel for legal representation.”). 
106 The oft-repeated phrase is that a poor person is entitled to a lawyer but not one of 
his or her choosing. See, e.g., People v. Sawyer, 57 N.Y.2d 12, 16 (1982) (“You may make 
your choice. One, represent yourself. Two be represented by the Public Defender. You 
have no other choice.” (quoting the trial judge)); United States v. Pina, 844 F.2d 1, 6 (1st 
Cir. 1988) (“Appellant apparently fails to understand that there is no absolute right to a 
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allocation of decision-making authority becomes of paramount importance. 
 A poor defendant has two preliminary choices – eschew a lawyer and 
opt for self-representation,107 or accept his or her constitutional right to a 
government supplied lawyer.108 Courts have made abundantly clear that 
there is no such thing as hybrid representation.109 If, for example, the client 
files a motion that the lawyer declined to file, the court is under no 
obligation to read it because the accused has opted to have a lawyer.110 As 
the New York Court of Appeals stated, a defendant who chooses to defend 
through counsel cannot, as of right, make motions, file a supplemental brief 
on appeal, sum up before a jury, “or otherwise participate personally in the 
proceedings[.]”111 In other words, if the accused accepts what he or she is 
constitutionally entitled to, he cedes control over substantial and critical 
aspects of his defense.  
There is also the well-documented seemingly intractable crisis in 
indigent defense characterized by lawyers with too many clients and too 
few resources.112 How much attention can typical Public Defenders pay to 
                                                                                                                       
counsel of one’s own choice; while a defendant may not be forced to proceed to trial with 
an incompetent or unprepared counsel, the court has no obligation to appoint a lawyer 
outside the public defender’s office simply because a defendant believes all lawyers from 
that office are incompetent.”). 
107 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 817 (1975).   
108 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 338 (1963) (guaranteeing indigent defendants 
the right to counsel in felony cases); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972) 
(extending Gideon’s reach to all cases where the accused faced the possibility of 
incarceration). 
109 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 179 (1984); see also United States v. Muyet, 
985 F. Supp. 440, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); People v. Rodriguez, 95 N.Y.2d 497, 500 (2000).  
110 Rodriguez, 95 N.Y.2d at 500.  
111 Id. at 501 (citations omitted). But see People v. Delgado, 281 A.D.2d 556, 556 (2d 
Dep’t 2001) (noting there may be some situations where an unjustified refusal to entertain a 
meritorious pro se motion would constitute an abuse of discretion). 
112 See Duncan v. State, 791 N.W.2d 713 (Mich. 2010); see also Hurell-Harring v. 
State, 15 N.Y.3d 8, 20-24 (2010); AM. BAR ASS’N., GIDEON UNDONE: THE CRISIS IN 
INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING (1982), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendant
s/downloads/indigentdefense/gideonundone.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/NME6-
SM8X]; COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL REPORT TO THE CHIEF 
JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 34 (2006), 
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/indigentdefense-
commission/IndigentDefenseCommission_report06.pdf [https://perma.cc/S64G-67TN] 
(“The crisis in indigent representation in this state is a well documented fact. The time for 
action is now.”); JOEL M. SCHUMM, STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT 
DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS’N, NATIONAL INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORM: THE SOLUTION IS 
MULTIFACETED (2012), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/books/ls_sclaid_def_national_in
digent_defense_reform.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/232D-3H7Z]; Cara H. Drinan, 
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each client to inform their decision making?  
Further, most Public Defenders don’t look like their clients or come 
from similar backgrounds.113 How should differences between lawyers and 
clients with respect to race, ethnicity, language, etc., affect who gets to 
make which decisions?114 The well-documented lack of trust between 
indigent defendants and their lawyers is exacerbated by the institutional 
nature of the provision of defense lawyers for the poor – anyone in the 
defendants’ shoes would question the loyalty of a lawyer supplied to them 
for free by the very government that is prosecuting them.115  
The decisions that vest power with defense counsel and mandate that 
she overrule her clients when they disagree elide the impact that will likely 
have on the attorney/client relationship going forward. While it is true that 
the Supreme Court decided that the accused has no right to a “meaningful 
relationship” with counsel,116 that is not a reason to ignore the effect on the 
                                                                                                                       
The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
427, 427 (2009) (“For years, scholars have documented the national crisis in indigent 
defense and its many tragic implications, and yet the crisis persists.”); Mary Sue Backus & 
Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 
1031 (2006). 
113 See, e.g., Kate Weisburd, Prosecutors Hide, Defendants Seek: The Erosion of 
Brady Through the Defendant Due Diligence Rule, 60 UCLA L. REV. 138, 173 (2012) 
(footnote omitted) (“Perceived and real differences in race and socioeconomic status also 
affect communication between clients and their lawyers. The criminal justice system 
disproportionately impacts poor people of color, whereas lawyers are disproportionately 
white and less likely to be poor.”). 
114 See, e.g., Muneer I. Ahmad, Interpreting Communities: Lawyering Across 
Language Difference, 54 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1007-31 (2007) (discussing lawyering across 
language barriers); Michelle S. Jacobs, People From the Footnotes: The Missing Element 
in Client-Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 374 (1997) (discussing 
how attorney-client relationships are impacted by race, gender, and culture); Shani M. 
King, Race, Identity, and Professional Responsibility: Why Legal Services Organizations 
Need African American Staff Attorneys, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 
(2008) (addressing the impact of race in building attorney-client relationships); Paul R. 
Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 
CLINICAL L. REV. 373, 387-403 (2002); Kenneth P. Troccoli, “I Want a Black Lawyer to 
Represent Me”: Addressing a Black Defendant’s Concerns With Being Assigned a White 
Court-Appointed Lawyer, 20 LAW & INEQ. 1, 17-26 (2002).  
115 See Steven Zeidman, Sacrificial Lambs or the Chosen Few?: The Impact of Student 
Defenders on the Rights of the Accused, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 853, 890-91 (1996) (describing 
factors related to client distrust of institutional indigent criminal defense attorneys); see 
also Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of 
Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59, 74 (1986) 
(“[D]efendants often do not trust defense counsel, particularly when the attorneys are 
public defenders or court appointees.”).  
116 See generally Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983); see also Siers v. Ryan, 773 F. 
2d 37, 44 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that indigent defendants have no right to any special 
rapport or even confidence in their court-appointed counsel). 
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accused and on the quality of the representation that results from lawyers 
overruling their own clients. 
It is hard to imagine being in prison and thinking every day that it would 
have turned out differently if only the lawyer did what I asked. But it is also 
hard to imagine being in prison and thinking every day that it would have 
turned out differently if only I listened to my lawyer. Is the lawyer 
ultimately just a mouthpiece? Isn’t it too easy for defense lawyers to 
absolve themselves of difficult decisions by simply falling back on a mantra 
of, “Well, it was his choice,” instead of accepting the heavy burden and 
responsibility of making crucial decisions? And if the adage is true that 
“[the] person who represents himself has a fool for a client,”117 then isn’t 
giving the accused decision-making power just a variation on that theme? Is 
someone likely filled with anxiety, fear, frustration, anger and misery (and 
typically lacking in legal training) in the best position to make his or her 
best legal decisions? In many cases, the accused’s current predicament is 
the result of bad choices he has made. Is it wise or “client-centered” for him 
to now be entrusted with decision-making authority of such importance?118 
Coming full circle to the most recent decision from New York’s highest 
court − who should decide whether to testify in the Grand Jury?119 If we 
adhere to the fundamental versus strategic decision dichotomy, why 
distinguish between testifying at trial (fundamental) and in the Grand Jury 
(strategic)? What about testifying at the sentencing phase of a capital 
case,120 or at a competency,121 parole violation,122 or suppression 
                                                
117 Marshall H. Tanick & Phillip J. Trobaugh, Lincoln’s Minnesota Legacy, BENCH & 
B. MINN., Feb. 2009, at 1, 4, http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2009/feb09/lincoln.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q9A9-HBTD] (quoting Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Isham Reavis 
(Nov. 5, 1855)). 
118 Scholars have posited a number of rationales for and against giving the accused 
greater decision-making authority. See generally Rodney J. Uphoff & Peter B. Wood, The 
Allocation of Decisionmaking Between Defense Counsel and Criminal Defendant: An 
Empirical Study of Attorney-Client Decisionmaking, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1998); see also 
Erica J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant’s Right to Control 
the Case, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1147 (2010); Christopher Johnson, The Law’s Hard Choice: 
Self-Inflicted Injustice or Lawyer-Inflicted Indignity, 93 KY. L.J. 39 (2004); Robert E. 
Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 621 (2005); H. Richard 
Uviller, Calling the Shots: The Allocation of Choice Between the Accused and Counsel in 
the Defense of a Criminal Case, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 719 (2000); Kimberly Helene 
Zelnick, In Gideon’s Shadow: The Loss of Defendant Autonomy and the Growing Scope of 
Attorney Discretion, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 363 (2003). 
119 See generally People v. Hogan, 26 N.Y.3d 779 (2016). 
120 See generally Canaan v. McBride, 395 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding failure to 
advise the defendant of his right to testify in the penalty phase proceeding of a capital 
murder case was ineffective assistance). 
121 See generally United States v. Gillenwater, 717 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding 
the defendant has a constitutional right to testify at a pretrial competency hearing that only 
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hearing?123  
The decision whether to testify at trial was not always deemed 
fundamental and for the accused to make. There is no right to testify in the 
explicit text of the Constitution. However, in Rock v. Arkansas124the 
Supreme Court found that the right to testify “has sources in several 
provisions of the Constitution[,]”125 including the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Compulsory Process Clause of 
the Sixth Amendment.126 Other courts observed that the right to testify is an 
inherent analog of the Fifth Amendment’s protection against compelled 
testimony.127 
Rock, however, did not address whether the decision to testify at trial 
was for the accused or counsel ultimately to make. The court in Wright v. 
Estelle128 wrestled with that very question and in a per curiam decision held 
that defense counsel had ultimate decision-making authority. The court saw 
the decision as one about strategy and strongly believed that defense 
counsel was far better equipped to make the best choice for the client:  
The question here is twofold: who is in a better position to judge 
trial strategy and who is in a better position to ensure the best 
interests of the defendant. This court’s history is filled with the 
recognition of the value of an attorney. No one could seriously 
contend that a defendant is in a better position to dictate trial 
strategy than his attorney.129 
As for client autonomy, the court believed that defense counsel had a 
responsibility to protect the defendant from his bad choices:  
An attorney is not necessarily ineffective if he determines not to 
                                                                                                                       
she or he can waive); see also United States v. Schlueter, 276 F. App’x 81, 84 (2d Cir. 
2008) (“For present purposes, we may assume without deciding that [defendant’s] right to 
testify at his competency hearing is tantamount to his right to testify at trial.”). 
122 See generally Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
123 See Hemingway v. Henderson, 754 F. Supp. 296, 302 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (“If a 
strategic decision by defense counsel not to seek to suppress a confession may constitute a 
waiver of the claim [because in counsel’s control], it would seem to follow that a strategic 
decision not to call the defendant as a witness at a suppression hearing, even when not 
made in full consultation with the defendant, should have a similar effect.”). 
124 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987). 
125 Id. at 51. 
126 Id. at 51-52. 
127 See, e.g., United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 1983). 
128 Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1978). 
129 Id. at 1073. The court expounded on its holding with much rhetorical flourish:  
“Trial attorneys are professional artisans working in a highly competitive arena that 
requires all the skills which education, training, and experience have given them. . . . A 
defendant has a right to necessary surgery, but he does not have the right to require the 
surgeon to perform an operation contrary to accepted medical practice.”  Id. 
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allow his client to testify, even though he should give great 
deference to a defendant’s desire to testify, however, we are here 
concerned with constitutional requirements and there is no 
constitutional requirement that a court-appointed attorney must 
walk his client to the electric chair.130  
Judge Godbold’s dissent was equally poetic and vigorous. He observed 
that many defendants might just believe that they have the capacity to 
persuade the jury, or that  
without regard to impact upon the jury, his desire to tell “his 
side” in a public forum may be of overriding importance to him. 
Indeed, in some circumstances the defendant, without regard to 
the risks, may wish to speak from the stand, over the head of 
judge and jury, to a larger audience.131 
Autonomy played a central part in Judge Godbold’s analysis. Rather 
than grant defense counsel the power to override the client in the name of 
protecting the client’s best interests, Judge Godbold wrote that the “wisdom 
or unwisdom of the defendant’s choice does not diminish his right to make 
it. The lawyer’s authority is vindicated when he advises his client.”132 
The majority and dissenting opinions in Wright serve well to frame the 
issue. For the majority, the lawyer, with his or her special training and 
experience, is the better trial tactician and knows how to achieve the best 
result for the client.133 For the dissent, the client’s desire to testify, even if 
                                                
130 Id. at 1073-74. 
131 Id. at 1078 (Godbold, J., dissenting).  Judge Godbold’s view on the subject seems to 
be powerfully heartfelt:  “Indeed, our history is replete with trials of defendants who faced 
the court, determined to speak before their fate was pronounced: Socrates, who condemned 
Athenian justice heedless of the cup of hemlock; Charles I, who challenged the jurisdiction 
of the Cromwellians over a divine monarch; Susan B. Anthony, who argued for the female 
ballot; and Sacco and Vanzetti, who revealed the flaws of their tribunal. To deny a 
defendant the right to tell his story from the stand dehumanizes the administration of 
justice. I cannot accept a decision that allows a jury to condemn to death or imprisonment a 
defendant who desires to speak, without ever having heard the sound of his voice.” Id.  
132 Id. at 1079. Even more pointedly, he wrote that the attorney’s role was not to 
“muzzle” the client.  Id. at 1078. 
133 Courts have proffered other reasons besides lawyer expertise for vesting defense 
counsel with decision-making authority over virtually all decisions designated as strategic.  
Some courts focus on the adversarial system and the overarching concern for a fair trial.  
See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 257 F.3d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The sound 
functioning of the adversarial system is critical to the American system of criminal justice.  
We intend to defend it.”).  Still other courts highlight the need for judicial efficiency.  See, 
e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242 (2008) (giving defense counsel control of 
trial management is a practical necessity); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1988) 
(“The adversary process could not function effectively if every tactical decision required 
client approval.”).  
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seemingly unwise, must be respected in the interests of personal dignity and 
autonomy. 
Ultimately, Judge Godbold’s position prevailed and every circuit that 
has since addressed the issue has deemed the right to testify at trial to be a 
fundamental, personal right that only the accused may waive.134 As the 11th 
Circuit held in United States v. Teague, “When an individual stands accused 
of criminal conduct, the choice to tell his side of the story has ramifications 
far beyond the mere immediate goal of obtaining an acquittal. It is, after all, 
the defendant’s day in court.”135 
 Why don’t those same principles and rationales apply to the accused’s 
Grand Jury testimony? Why is there nary a word in the Court of Appeals’s 
opinion in Hogan of the client autonomy issues hotly debated regarding the 
right to testify at trial? The decision simply notes that the right to testify in 
the Grand Jury is statutory (as opposed to the constitutional right to testify 
at trial),136 parrots the usual language about fundamental versus strategic 
decisions,137 and then states that a lawyer’s expertise is required because of 
the potential negative consequences that flow from the defendant’s Grand 
Jury testimony.138 
                                                
134 See, e.g., Jordan v. Hargett, 34 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. 
Ortiz, 82 F.3d 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174 (9th Cir. 1993). 
135 United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1533 (11th Cir. 1992) (emphasis in 
original). However, the ruling giving the accused the power to decide whether to testify 
was not unanimous: “I understand and agree that a defendant must personally decide how 
he will plead to the charges against him, whether he will waive trial by jury, and whether 
he will appeal. But these decisions are not about trial tactics; they are materially different. 
These decisions determine whether there is to be a fight and who will judge the fight’s 
outcome. But, once the client decides that there is to be a fight and that he wishes to be 
represented by a lawyer, I agree with those judges who say that defense counsel need not 
defer to the client’s desires on how the fight is to be waged.” Id. at 1536 (Edmondson, J., 
concurring).  Judge Edmondson also drew a distinction between the requirements of the 
ethical rules that vest with the client the right to make this decision and the requirements of 
effective assistance of counsel, noting that ethical guidelines might serve other purposes 
rather than obtaining an acquittal. Id. In his view, those other purposes “complicate[] too 
much an already complex question of what is effective representation.” Id. at 1537.  
136 People v. Smith, 665 87 N.Y.2d 715, 719 (1996) (holding that the right to testify in 
the Grand Jury is not a constitutional right). 
137 People v. Hogan, 26 N.Y.3d 779, 786 (2016) (“It is well established that a 
defendant, having accepted the assistance of counsel, retains authority only over certain 
fundamental decisions[.]” (quoting People v. Colon, 90 N.Y.2d 824, 825 (1997))). 
138 Id. The Court referred to the “potential disadvantages of providing the prosecution 
with discovery and impeachment material, making damaging admissions, and prematurely 
narrowing the scope of possible defenses[.]” Id. (quoting People v. Brown, 116 A.D.3d 568 
569 (2014)).  Other potential negative consequences include the prosecutor’s refusal to plea 
bargain or a subsequent indictment for perjury. See Ric Simmons, Re-examining the Grand 
Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1 
(2002). 
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However, although well-established, the fundamental versus strategic 
distinction articulated in Jones v. Barnes is devoid of any meaningful 
underlying rationale,139 and no court has yet taken the opportunity to 
acknowledge that truth and devise a more valid and useful way to 
distinguish the myriad decisions in a criminal case.  
The time is ripe for such an analysis. Although the Jones v. Barnes 
“fundamental four” Supreme Court pronouncement took root long ago, 
there has been mounting dissatisfaction with, and criticism of, the 
distinction between fundamental and strategic decisions. Section 4-5.2(a) of 
the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution 
Function and Defense Function, titled “Control and Direction of the Case,” 
used to provide that “decisions which are to be made by the accused . . . 
are” essentially the same ones spelled out in Jones.140 However, when the 
Standards were revised in 1993, Section 4-5.2(a) replaced the word “are” 
with the word “include” in order to “make it clear that this list is not 
deemed to be exclusive.”141  
Trial courts have been increasingly perplexed about how to allocate 
decision-making authority between lawyers and clients in capital cases 
(e.g., the accused wants to testify in favor of a death sentence against the 
wishes of defense counsel, or directs defense counsel not to present any 
mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of the case);142 cases with mental 
                                                
139 See Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New 
Paths – A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 115 (1986) (“[The Court in Jones v.] Barnes . 
. . casually brushed aside the deeply vexing question of lawyer versus client control[.]”); 
see also Rodney J. Uphoff, Who Should Control the Decision to Call a Witness: Respecting 
a Criminal Defendant’s Tactical Choices, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 763, 765 n.7 (2000) (quoting 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 559-60 (1992)) (“The 
problems of uncertainty are exacerbated . . . by the absence of any well reasoned guidelines 
for distinguishing between those decisions requiring defendant’s personal choice and those 
subject to counsel’s control over strategy.”).   
140 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEF. FUNCTION § 
4-5.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (emphasis added).  
141 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEF. FUNCTION 
hist. n. § 4-5.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/pros
ecution_defense_function.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JMM-DS4Q]. 
142 See, e.g., Gilreath v. Head, 234 F.3d 547, 550 (11th Cir. 2000); People v. Deere, 
710 P.2d 925 (Cal. 1985).  Issues also frequently arise when defense counsel wishes to 
withhold the defense at the guilt stage and use it solely at the penalty phase. See generally 
State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138, 1140 (Kan. 2000); People v. Frierson, 705 P.2d 396, 402 
(Cal. 1985); People v. Hattery, 488 N.E.2d 513, 516 (Ill. 1985).  In 2014, a man on death 
row wrote to the Supreme Court asking that the justices reject the petition for certiorari that 
he said was filed without his knowledge or consent by the Executive Director of the 
Atlantic Center for Capital Representation.  The Court denied the writ, directed defense 
counsel to file a response to the letter, and referred the allegations to the local disciplinary 
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health issues (e.g., a defendant with a history of mental illness is found 
competent to stand trial and then objects to his counsel’s interposition of a 
mental status defense);143 and cases with charges of terrorism (e.g., where 
the attorney wants to present a “traditional” criminal defense and the 
accused wants to assert a “political” defense).144 Left with no decipherable, 
coherent guidance, trial judges muddle through as best they can leading to 
different rules and outcomes in different courts. 
In one of the only examples of a Supreme Court Justice reflecting about 
which decisions are fundamental or strategic, Justice Scalia captured the 
extant lack of clarity: “I would not adopt the tactical-vs.-fundamental 
approach, which is vague and derives from nothing more substantial than 
this Court’s say-so. . . . What makes a right tactical? . . . Whether a right is 
‘fundamental’ is equally mysterious.”145 Justice Scalia would instead “adopt 
the rule that, as a constitutional matter, all waivable rights (except, of 
course, the right to counsel) can be waived by counsel.”146  
So back again to the decision whether to testify in the Grand Jury. 
Maybe the defendant knows his chances at trial are bleak and he wants to 
take a chance with the greater number of Grand versus Petit jurors.147 
Maybe he wants his day in court and knows that precious few cases actually 
go to a jury trial so this is likely his only chance.148 Maybe, just as was 
                                                                                                                       
board.  Ballard v. Pennsylvania, No. 13-9364 (U.S. Aug. 11, 2014) (order referring letters 
to Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania).  
143 See, e.g., Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 820 (Del. 2009); Kaddah v. Comm’r of 
Correction, 939 A.2d 1185, 1192 (Conn. 2008); Johnson v. State, 17 P.3d 1008, 1011 (Nev. 
2001); State v. Bean, 762 A.2d 1259, 1261 (Vt. 2000); Treece v. State, 547 A.2d 1054, 
1059 (Md. 1988). Several commentators have addressed the defense attorney’s challenges 
when representing clients with mental health issues. See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie et al., 
Decision-Making in Criminal Defense: An Empirical Study of Insanity Pleas and the 
Impact of Doubted Client Competence, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 48 (1996) (studying 
attorney-client decision-making in cases where the crucial decision was whether to pursue 
an insanity defense); Josephine Ross, Autonomy Versus a Client’s Best Interests: the 
Defense Lawyer’s Dilemma When Mentally Ill Clients Seek to Control Their Defense, 35 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1343 (1998); Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense 
Lawyer in Representing the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate of Officer of 
the Court?, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 65.  
144 See, e.g., United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690 (2d Cir. 2012); Mark Hamblett, 
Openings Completed in Trial of Alleged al Qaida Conspirator, 251 N.Y. L.J. 1 (2014); 
Benjamin Weiser, Embassy Bombing Suspects Try to Put American Courts on Trial, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/26/nyregion/embassy-bombing-
suspects-try-to-put-american-courts-on-trial.html. 
145 Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 256 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
146 Id. at 257. 
147 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.05 (McKinney 2016) (“A grand jury is a body 
consisting of not less than sixteen nor more than twenty-three persons[.]”). Id. § 270.05 (“A 
trial jury consists of twelve jurors[.]”). 
148 See Steven Zeidman, Gideon: Looking Backward, Looking Forward, Looking in the 
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imagined with some trial testimony, he wishes to talk beyond the Grand 
Jurors and reach a wider, if not higher, audience.149  
Courts that grant defense counsel ultimate decision-making authority 
over strategic choices assume that lawyers know best because they can rely 
on their legal training and experience. But is that actually true for the 
decision whether to testify in the Grand Jury? Many defense attorneys 
simply never put any clients to testify in the Grand Jury.150 Can it be 
properly deemed a strategic decision if it is a blanket rule with no individual 
case-by-case analysis?151  
Is it true that defense counsel knows best with respect to all strategic 
decisions? What about which jurors to keep or challenge peremptorily?152 
What special training or knowledge does defense counsel have in this 
regard that merits her having the final say? Courts have rarely carefully 
analyzed specific decisions to justify whether the lawyer really is best 
qualified to make a particular purportedly strategic decision. 
However, while one could argue about whether the right to testify in the 
Grand Jury is fundamental or strategic and who should make the final call, 
perhaps the more contentious underlying issue has to do with the court’s 
dispensing with the need for the lawyer to consult with the client (let alone 
obtain his consent). Recall that in Hogan, defense counsel did not discuss 
the issue with his client before he called the prosecutor and said the 
defendant would not testify.153 While the court said that discussing the 
decision with the client might be the “better practice,” it did not require 
it.154  
The Supreme Court in Florida v. Nixon155 emphasized the difference 
between consulting a client about a strategic decision and thereafter 
                                                                                                                       
Mirror, 11 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 933, 936 (2013); see also Michael M. O’Hear, Plea 
Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 409 (2008) (“[A]bout ninety-five 
percent of convictions are obtained by way of a guilty plea.”). 
149 See Mayson, supra note 101; see also INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 101.  
150 See Simmons, supra note 137, at 37 n.173 (citations omitted) (“Unfortunately not 
even the District Attorney’s offices themselves keep track of how many defendants actually 
testify – only one out of fifty-four counties surveyed reported that they compiled data on 
how often defendants gave notice to testify or actually testified. . . . Forty-one of the fifty-
four D.A.’s offices estimated that fewer than 10% of the incarcerated defendants who gave 
notice that they wished to testify actually did so.”). 
151 In her dissent in Hogan, Judge Jenny Rivera questioned how defense counsel could 
have made a strategic decision that his client would not testify without having even 
consulted with his client about his potential Grand Jury testimony.  People v. Hogan, 26 
N.Y.3d 779, 791 (2016) (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
152 See People v. Colon, 90 N.Y.2d 824 (1997). 
153 Hogan, 26 N.Y.3d at 791. 
154 Id. at 787.  
155 Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004). 
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obtaining the client’s consent to the lawyer’s preferred choice. Defense 
counsel discussed with the defendant the strategy of conceding guilt at the 
trial stage of the capital case so as to present as strong and coherent a 
position as possible at the sentencing phase.156 Nixon never gave his 
express consent but counsel conceded his guilt in his opening statement to 
the jury.157 
The Court reasoned that while counsel “undoubtedly has a duty to 
consult with the client regarding ‘important decisions,’ including questions 
of overarching defense strategy . . . [t]hat obligation, however, does not 
require counsel to obtain the defendant’s consent to ‘every tactical 
decision.’”158 Only for the standard four fundamental decisions (whether to 
plead guilty, waive a jury, testify at trial, and file an appeal) must counsel 
consult and obtain consent to her favored course of action.159 
The relevant ethical rules seemingly call for less by way of client 
consultation. The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice 
Prosecution Function and Defense Function provide that “Strategic and 
tactical decisions should be made by defense counsel after consultation with 
the client where feasible and appropriate.”160 The commentary explains 
that, “[n]umerous strategic and tactical decisions must be made in the 
course of a criminal trial, many of which are made in circumstances that do 
not allow extended, if any, consultation.”161 Apparent scorn for the client’s 
input is revealed in the commentary’s reference to “[e]very experienced 
advocate” recalling the “disconcerting experience of trying to conduct the 
examination of a witness . . . while the client ‘plucks at the attorney’s 
                                                
156 Id. at 178. 
157 Id. at 181-83. 
158 Id. at 187 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 
484 U.S. 400, 417-18 (1988)).  The Court’s reference to a “duty” to consult seems meant to 
imply an ethical obligation as opposed to a constitutional requirement.   
159 Id. 
160 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEF. FUNCTION § 
4-5.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/pros
ecution_defense_function.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JMM-DS4Q] (emphasis 
added); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N), 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_
of_professional_conduct/rule_1_2_scope_of_representation_allocation_of_authority_betw
een_client_lawyer.html [https://perma.cc/WVW9-8XUC] (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a 
client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . shall consult with the 
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”). 
161 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEF. FUNCTION § 
4-5.2 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/
prosecution_defense_function.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JMM-DS4Q]. 
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sleeve’ offering gratuitous suggestions.”162 However, the commentary does 
provide that certain decisions “can be anticipated sufficiently so that 
counsel can ordinarily consult with the client concerning them.”163   
While the Court in Nixon held that counsel could carry out strategic 
decisions without the client’s express agreement, the decision left 
unresolved the question of whether counsel could proceed on her preferred 
path even in the face of the client’s unequivocal disagreement. This is 
where the decision-making rubber hits the road. Assume the lawyer has 
consulted with the client. Assume further, that the lawyer ascribes to the 
belief that she is obligated to offer advice and to urge the client to accept 
her advice.164 Assume, however, that the client cannot be persuaded and 
explicitly disagrees with the choice urged by the attorney. Now what should 
counsel do?  
According to the New York Court of Appeals, the question is not what 
counsel should do but rather what counsel must do – she must overrule her 
client and go down the path she believes is best.165  
To someone unfamiliar with criminal defense, it likely seems strange 
that the accused does not get to make the final decision or even have the 
right to be consulted. But to Public Defenders it might actually be a relief to 
finally receive the Court’s imprimatur on their longstanding practice.  
As the majority pointed out in Hogan, testifying in the Grand Jury is 
fraught with significant potential negative consequences, such as providing 
the prosecution with discovery, admissions and impeachment material.166 
Those fears may well be overplayed given that so few cases actually do go 
to trial, but for most lawyers discretion is the better part of valor when it 
comes to clients testifying in the Grand Jury.  
Still, the possible costs only explain the reasons why defense lawyers 
believe their clients should not testify in the Grand Jury, not why so many 
lawyers decline to inform, let alone consult, their clients about their right to 
testify in the first place.  
Consider the typical situation where the lawyer meets her client within 
                                                
162 Id.  
163 Id. 
164 See Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not to Plead: Effective Assistance and Client-
Centered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841 (1998); see also Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73 
(2d Cir. 1997) (noting that counsel may “strongly advise” the course that counsel thinks is 
best); Dean v. Clinton Correctional Facility, 93 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 1996) (referring to the 
“vigor” with which competent defense counsel advises clients about significant decisions). 
165 See, e.g., United States v. Chapman, 593 F.3d 365, 369 (4th Cir. 2010) (“And if 
consultation and consent by the client are not required with regard to . . . tactical decisions, 
the client’s expressed disagreement with counsel’s decision cannot somehow convert the 
matter into one that must be decided by the client.”).  
166 People v. Hogan, 26 N.Y.3d 779, 786 (2016); see also Simmons, supra note 137.  
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twenty-four hours of his arrest. She has a limited amount of time to conduct 
her interview, and in that time needs to learn the essential facts of the case 
and factors to persuade the judge to release her client on his own 
recognizance. Now add to the mix a discussion of the right to testify in the 
Grand Jury. Complicating that discussion of the right to testify is the 
lawyer’s conviction that it will be not be exercised. For many lawyers, the 
idea of telling their client they have a right, but in the next breath telling 
them they should waive it, is too likely to lead to confusion, greater distrust, 
and conflict. Put simply, many defense lawyers, like defense counsel in 
Hogan, don’t “see the benefit to [testifying in the Grand Jury], only the 
harm,”167 and therefore decide it is a conversation best left unsaid.   
The fundamental decision about whether the accused should testify at 
trial often reveals similar motivations on the part of defense counsel. 
Defense lawyers for the most part also tend not to want their clients to 
testify at trial.168 Some people just don’t make good, compelling, persuasive 
witnesses, are easily intimidated, are subject to impeachment, or have a 
prior record. There is also the fear that by testifying the defendant somehow 
relieves the prosecution of its burden of proof. But, again, these 
considerations only go to defense counsels’ reasons for preferring that their 
clients do not testify. What, if anything, do they tell their clients about this 
fundamental constitutional right in cases where they firmly believe it should 
not be exercised? 
 The trial judge is not obligated to inform the accused of his right to 
testify.169 Often, when the prosecution announces the end of its case-in-
                                                
167 Hogan, 26 N.Y.3d at 782.  
168 See Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal 
Rules that Encourage Defendants to Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 852 (2008) 
(“Although the exact numbers vary by jurisdiction, studies reveal that up to half of all 
criminal defendants who proceed to trial elect not to testify on their own behalf, and that 
this percentage has been increasing since at least the early twentieth century.”). 
169 Only a few states require a trial judge to apprise the defendant of his right to testify 
and hold an on-the-record colloquy regarding any waiver of that right. See Timothy P. 
O’Neill, Vindicating the Defendant’s Constitutional Right to Testify at a Criminal Trial: 
The Need for an On-the-Record Waiver, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 810 (1990). Federal 
courts do not impose a requirement that the trial judge inform the defendant of his right to 
testify and/or conduct an on-the-record colloquy to make sure the decision not to testify is 
the result of a voluntary waiver. See Artuz, 124 F.3d at 79 (“Just as the trial judge need not 
stop a defendant called by defense counsel to the stand and explain the right not to testify, 
the judge need not intervene when counsel announces that the defendant rests and the 
defendant has not testified.”); see also United States v. Ortiz, 82 F.3d 1066 (D.C. Cir. 
1996); United States v. Brimberry, 961 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1992); Siciliano v. Vose, 834 
F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1987).  The concerns are that any such dialogue might interfere with the 
attorney-client relationship and defense strategy, or in some way indicate to the accused 
that the court has an opinion on the matter. See United States v. Pennycooke, 65 F.3d 9 (3d 
Cir. 1995). 
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chief, the trial judge simply asks defense counsel if she is “putting on a 
case” or has “any witnesses.” If counsel answers in the negative, that ends 
the inquiry.170  
However, while the court is under no obligation to advise the accused 
about his right to testify, must defense counsel so inform her client? In 
People v. Windley,171 at a post-conviction hearing regarding the defendant’s 
claim that he was not advised of his right to testify at trial, his trial lawyer 
was asked if he discussed with his client whether he was going to testify. 
Counsel replied: “I’m not sure of that. . . . My philosophical bend, as a 
result of long discussions and pondering over that issue . . . [is] that you 
never put a defendant on the stand. Period.”172 When he was then asked 
whether that was his strategy in not putting this particular client on the 
stand, he replied, “In every case.”173  
While counsel in Windley may have been expressing the attitude and 
practice of many defense lawyers, the courts have a different view. In 
People v. Cosby174 the court reiterated that there is no obligation on the part 
of the trial judge to inquire about the defendant’s apparent decision not to 
testify, but held that defense counsel must advise her client of the right to 
testify and, further, must tell her client that the decision, the ultimate 
authority, rests with him.175 This judicial pronouncement likely caused 
consternation among many Public Defenders who fear that if they tell their 
client about his right to testify, and further explain that he is the ultimate 
                                                
170 Contrast the lack of an on-the-record colloquy or some similar kind of verification 
when the defendant waives or exercises other fundamental rights. See, e.g., Taylor v. 
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
171 People v. Windley, 28 Misc. 3d 1232(A) (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 2010). 
172 Id. at *7 (emphasis added). 
173 Id. (emphasis added). 
174 People v. Cosby, 82 A.D.3d 63 (4th Dep’t 2011). 
175 See Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Although counsel should 
always advise the defendant about the benefits and hazards of testifying and of not 
testifying, and may strongly advise the course that counsel thinks best, counsel must inform 
the defendant that the ultimate decision whether to take the stand belongs to the defendant, 
and counsel must abide by the defendant’s decision on this matter.”).  Similarly, counsel 
must advise the defendant of his or her right to appeal.  See Wolfe v. Randle, 267 F. Supp. 
2d 743, 748 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (“[A] defendant must be told of his right to appeal, the 
procedures and time limits involved in proceeding with that appeal, and the right to have 
assistance of appointed counsel for that appeal.”); see also White v. Johnson, 180 F.3d 648, 
652 (5th Cir. 1999). In New York, the defendant has the right to appeal from final 
judgments in all criminal cases.  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 450.10, 1.20 (2013); People v. 
Callahan, 80 N.Y.2d 273 (1992); People v. Pollenz, 67 N.Y.2d 264, 268 (1986).  Whether 
defendants are in fact advised of their right to appeal and that they have the ultimate 
authority to decide whether to appeal is an intriguing question that is beyond the scope of 
this article.  
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decision maker, he just might insist on testifying.176  
Many years ago, when I was a supervising attorney in a Public Defender 
office, a staff attorney called me from the courthouse. He had a client who 
was insisting that he wanted to testify in the Grand Jury, and the lawyer 
thought that was a bad idea for all the usual reasons and also because his 
client’s narrative was far from compelling. I went to court, talked with his 
client, and shared the attorney’s assessment. Nevertheless, we could not 
convince our client that testifying was a terrible idea.  
We considered our two choices – allow the client to testify or deny him 
his statutory right. The charges were serious and we went back and forth for 
the next few hours. New York’s Criminal Procedure Law provides that if 
bail were set on a felony the prosecutor must obtain an indictment within 
120-144 hours or the accused must be released.177 We were at the end of 
that time limit and the prosecutor was waiting to present the case to the 
Grand Jury. Then we realized we had a third option – we waived for one 
day the statutory requirement that the prosecutor indict or release our 
client.178 We thought that if our client slept on it and talked with other 
people incarcerated at Rikers Island he would come to the right conclusion.  
The next day was more of the same. He insisted on testifying and we 
again waived his statutory right, this time for two days to give us time to go 
talk with him at Rikers Island. There was a long, hard conversation the next 
day at the jail that ended as it began – he still insisted on testifying.  
Back in court, we were now firmly faced with two options: allow or 
deny him his right to testify in the Grand Jury. Even though we thought, 
actually we were convinced, that it was a terrible idea, we called the 
prosecutor and told him our client did in fact intend to exercise his right to 
testify in the Grand Jury.  
The prosecutor called the defendant into the Grand Jury and he testified 
to an improbable and somewhat different version of events than he had told 
                                                
176 In Starkweather v. Smith, 574 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2009), the defendant claimed 
ineffective assistance of counsel in that his lawyer encouraged him not to testify but never 
explained the basis for that advice (and that, as a result, his waiver of his right to testify 
was not knowing and intelligent).  The Court candidly noted that perhaps counsel declined 
to explain his rationale out of concern that it might actually lead the accused to insist on 
testifying, but stated, “[b]e that as it may, an attorney’s ethical duty to consult with his or 
her client is no less in situations where the attorney (perhaps reasonably) judges it best to 
keep his or her client in the dark.” Id. at 404. However, while noting an aspirational ethical 
duty to consult, the Court ultimately stated there were no cases that actually establish that 
the Sixth Amendment requires an attorney to explain the basis for his or her legal advice. 
Id.     
177 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.80 (McKinney 1982). The other option, seldom used 
by the prosecution, is to hold a preliminary hearing for a judge to determine whether there 
is reasonable cause to believe the accused committed a crime. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.70.  
178 CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.80(1). 
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us. We walked out of the Grand Jury room and waited to hear the inevitable 
news of an indictment from the prosecutor. Several minutes later he came 
out and mumbled, “They voted no true bill. Your guy is being released.” 
Our guy? I’m sure he didn’t feel like he was in any way shape or form “our 
guy.” 
We waited for our client to be released but he must have gone out 
through a different door because we never saw him again. Did we do the 
right thing? I don’t know, but the Court of Appeals certainly doesn’t think 
so.179 
 
* * * 
 
 
                                                
179 People v. Hogan, 26 N.Y.3d 779 (2016).  
